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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 14173

vs.
PARLEY E. NIELSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case in which the defendant
was charged with having in his possession a dangerous
weapon after having been convicted of a crime of violence,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was found guilty, by a jury of
the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a
convicted person, after trial of the matter before the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the Fourth Judicial
District Court.
RELIEF SOUGHTON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully seeks an affirmance
of the trial court decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant in this case was found guilty
by a jury of the crime of possession of a dangerous
weapon after having been convicted of a crime of
violence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503
(1953).
The first element of this crime is a prior
conviction:

On December 21, 19 72, the defendant,

Parley Edward Nielsen, was convicted by a jury of the
charge of assault with a deadly weapon (T.ll).
Defendant was later sentenced to the Utah State Prison
pursuant to the requirements of the statute and was
later paroled from said prison.
On December 7, 1974, the defendant visited Al's
Lounge in Pleasant Grove, Utah (T. 40).
The defendant then got in an argument with a man
named Wayne Adams (T. 35-36).
The defendant then requested a Mr. Craig
Smith to take him home (T. 41). After the defendant
changed clothes Mr. Smith gave the defendant a ride
back to the lounge (T. 41). At this time Mr. Smith
testified that the defendant was in possession of a
clip to a gun (T. 42). The proprietor of the bar
testified that he saw what he thoughtwas a gun in the
possession of the defendant (T. 52). Craig Brackenburg,
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a witness, testified that he saw a gun in the hand
of the defendant (T. 66). Another witness, Evelyn
Ekins, testified that she also saw a gun in the hand
of the defendant (T. 78). Mrs. Ekins also testified
that she heard the defendant tell Mr. Kent Gurney,
the owner that if he called the police, that he
(the defendant) would kill him (T. 87) .

Defense

counsel introduced testimony of other witnesses that
testified that they did not see the defendant in
possession of a gun (T. 114, 118).
However, it is the function of the jury to
determine the credibility of witnesses as the trier
of fact and it should be presuraed that the jury carried
out this function properly.

A verdict of guilty was

returned and the defendant was sentenced to the Utah
State Prison.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6.
The defendant was charged with violation of
Section 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled
"Possession of Dangerous Weapon by Convicted Person,
Drug Addict, or Mentally Incompetent Person Prohilited."
The pertinent language of the statute is as follows:

"Any person who is not a citizen
of the United States, or any person
who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of . . . the
State of Utah . . • shall not own or
have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in this part. Any person who
violates this section is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm or a sawed-off shotgun he shall be guilty of a felony of the
third degree."
In instructing the jury as to the law set forth
in the above section of the Utah Criminal Code, the
Court gave instruction number 6:
"Instruction No. 6
"The essential elements of the crime
charged in the information are as
follows: (1) That the defendant
had a gun in his possession on or
about December 7, 19 74; (2) That
sometime previously he had been convicted of a crime of violence under
the laws of the state of Utah.
"If you believe that the evidence
establishes both of the above elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is your duty to convict
the defendant; if the evidence has
failed to so establish either of
said elements, then you should
find the defendant not guilty."
Instruction 6

is basically a restatement

of the elements charged in the information which does
not constitute reversible error.
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In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 35 0, 366 P. 2d
701 (1961), the Utah Supreme Court stated the purpose
of instructions to the jury.

It held that, "The

purpose of instructions is correctly to present facts,
necessary to be determined, and applicable principles
of law in a clear and understandable manner."
The court went on further to state that:
"When the error assigned is the
giving or failure to give instructions,
the real inquiry should be were the
issues of fact necessary to be determined
and the principles of law applicable
thereto, correctly presented to the
jury in a clear and understandable
manner?"
In our case the court told the jury in clear
and unmistakable language of the elements of the crime
needed to find the defendant guilty.
Appellant contends that the use of the word
"gun" instead of "dangerous weapon" is prejudicial.
In Instruction 6 the court merely restated the charges
in the information.

The key language which prevents

appellant from being prejudiced is:
"If you believe that the evidence
establishes both of the above elements—"
The use of the word "gun" cannot be prejudicial because
the jury is surely aware of the charges against the
appellant.
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In Johnson v, United Pacific Insurance Company,
11 Utah 2d 279, 358 P.2d 337 (1961), the court held that:
"While court may not comment upon
evidence in jury trial this does not
mean that court cannot mention the
evidence or the facts, and what must
be avoided is commenting upon evidence
in such a way as to indicate an opinion as to what the facts are on disputed issues."
In the instant case the use of the word "gun"
does not indicate an opinion of what the disputed facts
are, it is merely a restatement of the charges in the
information.
The court in Johnson, supra, went on further
to state that:
"We recognize that our law
does not allow the court to comment
on the evidence in jury trials.
However, this does not mean that
he cannot mention the evidence or
the facts. The instructions cannot
be prepared in a vacuum, nor given
wholly in the abstract. In order
to make them realistic and understandable they should be correlated
to the issues of fact involved in
the particular case. This sometimes requires reference to the
evidence and the claims of the
parties, and there is no harm in
doing so. What must be avoided
is commenting on the evidence in
such a. way as to indicate an opinion as to what the facts are on
disputed issues. Viewed in that
light we see no error in the instruction complainedof."
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Even if it was error, and the words "dangerou^ weapon"
instead of "gun" should have been used; respondent
contends that it was harmless error, because in light of
the facts in the instant case, and not giving the instructions
in a vacuum as enunciated in the Johnson case, the jury was
still left to determine whether the appellant in fact had a
gun.

Instruction No. 6 does not imply that the court has

concluded or given an opinion on the disputed facts of this
case; therefore, instruction 6 does not amount to prejudicial
error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION; AND IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7
BECAUSE A PISTOL IS A DANGEROUS WEAPON PER SE UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
In Section 76-10-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the
words "dangerous weapon" and "firearm" are defined.

In sub-

paragraph 1 of said section the definition of dangerous weapon
appears and the language is as follows:
"Dangerous weapon means any item that
in the manner of its use or intended use
is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. In construing whether an item, object,
or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon, the character of the
instrument, object, or thing; the character
of the wound produced, if any; and the manner
in which the instrument, object, or thing was
used shall be determinative."
In subparagraph 2 of said section, the word "firearm"
is defined as follows:
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"Firearms means pistols, revolvers,
sawed-off shotguns, or sawed-off rifles, and/
or any device that could be used as a weapon
from which is expelled a projectile by any
force.'1
The Court in this case gave the following instruction:
"Instruction No. 7
"For your purposes in determining
guilt or innocence of the defendant,
assault with a deadly weapon is a crime
of violence, and a pistol-type handgun
is a dangerous weapon under the laws of
this state. However, a gun clip alone
with or without cartridges in it is not
a dangerous weapon within the meaning
of the law under which the defendant
is charged."
Appellant contends that a pistol is not a dangerous
weapon per se and, therefore, the following instruction
should have been given:
"Instruction No. 1. You are instructed
that a dangerous weapon means any item
that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury. You
are further instructed that in construing whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous
weapon is a dangerous weapon, the
character of the instrument, object,
or thing and the manner in which the
instrument, object, or thing was used
shall be determinative."
The requested instruction was properly denied because
it does not reflect the correct applicable law.
Instruction 7, given by the court in the instant case

»
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is proper because under this statute a pistol should
be construed as a dangerous weapon per se.
Statutes prohibiting the carrying or possessing
of dangerous or deadly weapons apply to weapons which
in their intended or readily adaptable use are likely
to produce death or serious bodily injury.

94 C.J.S.

Weapons § 6. Under these statutes it is unlawful to
possess firearms even though unloaded.

94

C. J.S.

Weapons § 6.
In State v. Quail, 28 Del. 310, 92 A. 859 ( 1914) ,
the court stated that it is immaterial whether the pistol
is loaded or not because such an instrument is commonly
regarded as a deadly weapon.

It is the manifest policy

and intent of the law to prevent carrying of such
deadly weapons.
The court in Quail, supra, states that, "If
we should sustain the contentions of the defendant we
fear that many persons would carry a pistol unloaded
but at the same time have bullets secreted upon their
person to be used if desired."
This theory is advanced by recent case law
wherein the court in State of Kansas v. Omo, 199 Kan.
167, 428 P.2d 768 (1967) held that a defendant could be
convicted of unlawful possession of a pistol without a
specific showing that the weapon was actually capable

of being fired since a pistol is a deadly weapon per
se.
This decision was upheld in State of Kansas
v, Sullivan, 210 Kan. 842, 504 P.2d 190 (1972).
Appellant contends that there is a division
of authority on whether a handgun or pistol should
be considered a dangerous weapon per se.

This is not

an accurate assessment of the law when a state has
a statute prohibiting ex-convicts from possessing
dangerous weapons.

In these cases the state has a

much stronger obligation to protect society.

The

statute under consideration was directed toward the
safeguarding of the public peace and security and
is a proper exercise of the police powers.

There is

no authority allowing an ex-convict to possess a commonly
known dangerous weapon such as a gun, because it is
unloaded.

Even though Utah has not specifically

decided this issue in case law, it appears that the
legislature determined that possession of firearms
by ex-convicts was harmful by drafting the appropriate
legislation.

The statute makes the narrow classification

of ex-convicts; in the interest of public policy,
security would be better served by construing a pistol
in the possession of an ex-convict as dangerous per se.
Therefore, the court in our case denying appellantfs
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requested instruction and giving instruction 7 uses
sound discretion and afforded appellant a non-prejudicia
fair trial.
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that the trial court was
correct in giving instructions number 6 and 7 because
they recite the applicable law to be applied to the
issues of this case.

Neither instruction 6 or 7 amount

to reversible, prejudicial error.

The language of

Section 76-10-501 in conjunction with Section 76-10-503
does not require a consideration of whether the gun was
loaded in this particular case.

A gun in the possession

of an ex-convict, in a public lounge, is a dangerous
weapon per se for the protection of the public.
Respondent respectfully submits that defendant was not
prejudiced but received a fair trial and the decision
of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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